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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Janice P. Stewart appeals from the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Rutgers, the State 
University of New Jersey; Joseph J. Seneca, chair of its 
Promotion and Review Committee ("PRC"); and Francis L. 
Lawrence, president of Rutgers (collectively "Rutgers") on 
her racial discrimination claim initiated pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1981(c), and her Equal Protection claim brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She argues that the record 
contains evidence from which a jury could conclude: (1) 
that the rejection of her 1994-95 tenure bid was motivated 
by racial discrimination; and (2) that Rutgers' proffered 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for not granting 
tenure to her are not worthy of credence. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we will reverse the district 
court's grant of summary judgment as to both of Stewart's 
claims. 
 
I. 
 
Dr. Janice P. Stewart, who is black, was an Assistant 
Professor in the Department of Learning and Teaching at 
the Graduate School of Education at Rutgers University, 
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New Brunswick campus. From the 1990-1991 academic 
year to the 1994-1995 academic year, Rutgers considered 
368 faculty members for tenure, of whom 238 were granted 
tenure, a success rate of sixty-five percent. During 
Stewart's employment at Rutgers, no black person was ever 
granted tenure in her department. Joint Appendix ("JA") at 
695. The only black person to be granted tenure in the 
Department of Learning and Teaching was a professor who 
was hired from another university with tenure. Id. Except 
for that person, there has not been a tenured black 
member of the department for over twenty years. JA at 797. 
 
Rutgers makes tenure decisions by considering the 
teaching, service and scholarship of the tenure applicant. 
Several factors are considered when evaluating scholarship: 
peer evaluations, research, presentation of papers, 
fellowship and grant awards and publication of books and 
articles. No single factor is dispositive. 
 
Rutgers' procedure for considering applicants for the 
position of Associate Professor with tenure, described 
in the 1994-95 "Academic Reappointment/Promotion  
Instructions,"1 requires that an applicant prepare a 
description of his or her qualifications, including scholarly 
accomplishments. This information is compiled on "Form 
a-1." Form a-1 and supplementary materials consisting of 
confidential letters of recommendation and other evaluation 
forms comprise the applicant's "Promotion Packet." 
 
The Promotion Packet is first evaluated by tenured 
members of the candidate's department. The department 
produces an evaluation which reflects majority and 
minority views on the substance of the candidate's 
application. JA at 66. The Promotion Packet is also 
evaluated by the Appointments and Promotions Committee 
("A & P Committee"), which is composed of faculty members 
of the candidate's institution. The department's and the A 
& P Committee's evaluations are then considered by the 
dean, who makes an independent recommendation. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Stewart applied for tenure during both the 1992-93 academic year and 
the 1994-95 academic year. The 1992-93 instructions are essentially the 
same as the 1994-95 instructions. 
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The next review is performed by the PRC. The PRC is 
charged with making promotion recommendations to the 
president of Rutgers. The PRC's purpose is to guard the 
integrity of the tenure review process by ensuring that 
evaluations of candidates have been made by leaders in 
their academic fields and that "appropriate evidence and 
analysis have been presented of accomplishment and 
impact on the field to support these judgments." JA at 67. 
After the PRC makes such an assessment, it then makes a 
recommendation to the president of the university. After 
review of all materials relating to the applicant, the 
university's president makes a recommendation to the 
Board of Governors, which makes the final decision to 
grant or deny tenure. Each candidate for tenure is reviewed 
independently by the PRC, without respect to the 
credentials of other candidates. 
 
Stewart first applied for tenure during the 1992-1993 
academic year and was unsuccessful. Stewart's Promotion 
Packet contained evaluations from nine referees, who were 
faculty members at other universities. The referees were 
asked to assess Stewart's scholarship, evaluating the 
"originality and quality of [her] achievements, their impact 
upon the field and the value of [her] contributions to the 
profession," and her accomplishments "relative to others in 
comparable positions in the discipline nationally and 
internationally." JA at 246. The referees' responses were 
varied. 
 
The Department of Learning and Teaching recommended 
Stewart for promotion to Associate Professor with tenure by 
a vote of eleven to one. However, the department observed 
that Stewart had not fully demonstrated peer acceptance 
and recognition of her work because she had failed to 
publish in refereed journals. The department also noted 
that most of Stewart's work was collaborative, and that only 
recently did she develop an independent line of research. 
 
The A & P Committee recommended against promotion 
and tenure by a two to one vote. JA at 345-46. Specifically, 
the Committee stated that Stewart was a not a strong 
candidate, but demonstrated potential for being a 
productive, nationally visible scholar. Id. at 345. After 
considering the recommendations from the department and 
 
                                4 
the A & P Committee, acting Dean Nobuo Shimahara 
recommended granting tenure. Id. at 349. The dean's 
decision was based on seven of the nine peer reviews which 
commended Stewart's scholarship. Id. at 347. The dean 
noted that although many of Stewart's works were 
collaborative and that she had only one publication in a 
refereed journal, he viewed her work as "definitely 
substantial and meritorious" and "broadly recognized." Id. 
at 348. 
 
In contrast, the PRC recommended that Stewart be 
denied tenure. Id. at 350. It noted that reviewers of 
Stewart's work found a lack of substantive contribution in 
scholarship and that the independence and quality had 
been questioned. Id. The PRC concluded that based on the 
record, Stewart "had not achieved a level of scholarly 
accomplishment to justify promotion to the level of 
Associate Professor with tenure." Id. President Lawrence 
concurred with the PRC's recommendation and so informed 
the Board. The Board thereafter denied tenure. Stewart was 
informed of the Board's decision by letter dated April 2, 
1993. 
 
Stewart filed a grievance concerning the decision to deny 
tenure. She claimed that the PRC's conclusion contained 
material factual errors. Stewart alleged that the decision 
was arbitrary and capricious and that procedural violations 
occurred. She also alleged racial and gender discrimination. 
 
The grievance committee found that the PRC's report 
contained material factual inconsistencies and that the 
PRC's decision had been made arbitrarily and capriciously. 
It remanded Stewart's application for full re-evaluation with 
an opportunity for Stewart to update relevant information. 
Id. at 109. The committee found that the PRC's report was 
not fully accurate on three points: (1) it failed to mention 
that six of the nine peer reviews stated that Stewart's work 
was more than merely promising, (2) it failed to reflect that 
six of the peers were highly positive of Stewart's written 
work and (3) the peer reviewers did not question the 
independence or quality of Stewart's work. The committee 
then concluded that Stewart's 1992-1993 rejection"could 
not have been reached by reasonable evaluators." However, 
the committee found no pattern of race or gender 
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discrimination. Id. at 109, 113. Though the committee 
found no pattern of discrimination, it noted that: 
 
[t]here was no apparent pattern of racial or sexual 
discrimination, but serious deficiencies in the areas of 
supervision, advice, mentoring, and assignment of 
duties were apparent . . . The obvious and traditional 
University concern with providing special support for 
minority faculty was not evident in materials presented 
at the hearing for this candidate. The [Graduate School 
of Education] did not seem to carry out expectations of 
affirmative action . . . [Stewart's allegations of racial 
discrimination] were not proven in the technical sense, 
but the [Promotion Review Committee] should be 
apprised of the setting for this candidate's probationary 
years at Rutgers in the context of the University's 
commitment to affirmative action. 
 
JA at 112.2 
 
Stewart applied for tenure again during the 1994-1995 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The grievance committee's conclusion that there was no racial 
discrimination relating to the denial of Stewart's tenure bid is not 
definitive. The grievance committee explicitly concluded that although 
there was no "apparent" racial discrimination in the "technical sense," 
there was sufficient evidence to illustrate that the Promotion Review 
Committee did not conduct its review of Stewart's bid for tenure 
consistent with the University's affirmative action policy, as noted above. 
Further, the grievance committee's finding that there was no pattern of 
racial discrimination was limited to the specific allegation made by 
Stewart that the conduct of the Department of Teaching and Learning 
and its Chairperson, not the Promotion Review Committee, demonstrated 
a pattern of discrimination against her. Finally, the record indicates that 
in reviewing Stewart's 1994-95 bid for tenure, the grievance committee 
was not permitted to consider or evaluate the promotion packets of other 
individuals in assessing her discrimination claims. Assuming that the 
grievance committee was similarly restricted in 1994, it is obvious that 
the committee could not consider factors critical to Stewart's showing of 
pretext, and thus critical to her claim in this litigation. In sum, the 
circumstances indicate that the grievance committee's finding of no 
discrimination does not end the inquiry, as the specific claims and 
theories alleged by Stewart could not have been fully addressed by the 
grievance committee, to the extent that they were presented to the 
committee for review. 
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year. In this evaluation, individuals outside Rutgers again 
submitted peer review recommendations. The peer review 
comments were generally positive. Some stated that Stewart 
likely would be granted tenure at their respective 
institutions. In general the comments commended Stewart's 
contributions and position of authority in the field. One 
review was less favorable. It expressed the view that 
Stewart's productivity was weak because she had published 
three articles as first author in mediocre journals which are 
not research-oriented. JA at 433. 
 
The department unanimously recommended Stewart for 
promotion. Id. at 446. Faculty members rated Stewart's 
scholarship from outstanding to average, with seven of ten 
rating her "above average." Id. at 445. The department's 
report stated that referees were extremely positive but 
noted areas of concern. Id. at 444. 
 
The A & P Committee assessed Stewart's scholarship as 
somewhat limited, but passable. It also noted that Stewart 
"ha[d] accumulated a strong and improving record of 
research, teaching and service to minority groups and, 
therefore, in addition to her other accomplishments, ha[d] 
advanced the purposes of the University's Affirmative Action 
program." JA at 455. Louise Cherry Wilkinson, dean of the 
Graduate School of Education, recommended Stewart for 
promotion. She viewed Stewart's scholarship as above 
average, and her work in the field as above average and 
well regarded. She further found that the quality and 
impact of Stewart's research was high, but that the 
quantity was not above the norm. JA at 450-51. 
 
The PRC stated that because Stewart had not established 
a record of substantial, independent productivity, she had 
not demonstrated the requisite level of scholarship to justify 
promotion with tenure. Id. at 351. The PRC also determined 
that Stewart's work lacked significant, external peer- 
reviewed support and did not demonstrate substantial 
national impact. Id. 
 
Again, the president and the Board denied promotion 
with tenure. JA at 115. Stewart was informed by letter on 
June 13, 1995. Id. Stewart filed another grievance claiming 
factual errors by the PRC, arbitrary and capricious 
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decision-making and racial discrimination. The grievance 
was denied in its entirety. 
 
Two professors in Stewart's department were granted 
tenure in the 1994-1995 academic year, Drs. Kelly and 
Smith. The peer reviews which were part of these 
professors' Promotion Packets featured evaluations which 
were generally more laudatory than Stewart's. JA at 499, 
524, 599, 629. Furthermore, these professors had received 
greater grant support than Stewart. Drs. Kelly and Smith 
obtained $623,653.00 and $18,039, respectively. Id. at 485, 
586. Stewart obtained $13,500.00. Id. at 282-83. 
 
On May 10, 1996, the district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants. With respect to the 
March 1993 denial of tenure, the district court found that 
Stewart's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(c) and 1983 were 
time barred, a ruling not contested on appeal. With respect 
to the tenure rejection of May 1995, the district court 
determined that no issues of material fact existed regarding 
Stewart's claim that her tenure denial in 1994-95 was 
motivated by racial discrimination. This appeal followed. 
 
Our review of a district court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary, and we are required to apply the same 
test the district court should have utilized initially. 
Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir. 
1987) (en banc). The district court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
The question before us is whether there is sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine issue as to whether the 
employer intentionally discriminated. Weldon v. Draft, 896 
F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 1990). In order for Rutgers to 
succeed on a motion for summary judgment, it must show 
that Stewart "will be unable to introduce either direct 
evidence of a purpose to discriminate or indirect evidence 
by showing that the proffered reason [for her tenure denial] 
is subject to factual dispute." Id. 
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We are required to examine the evidence of record in the 
light most favorable to Stewart, as the party opposing 
summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences 
in her favor. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "This standard is 
applied with added rigor in employment discrimination 
cases, where intent and credibility are crucial issues." 
Robinson v. PPG Indus. Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
 
B. 
 
At issue is whether Stewart has satisfied her burden 
under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework to show 
that racial discrimination motivated her tenure denial, or 
that Rutgers' nondiscriminatory reason for such denial is 
unworthy of credence. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Our application of the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework is applicable to 
Stewart's allegation of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 19813 and 1983.4 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502, 506 n.1 (1993) (assuming applicability of 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 mandates that: 
 
[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). This section further instructs that "[t]he rights 
protected by this section are protected against impairment by 
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State 
law." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c). 
 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part: 
 
"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any state . . . subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the 
party injured . . . ." 
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Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) 
(applying framework to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
 
Under McDonnell Douglas, Stewart must first establish a 
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. St. 
Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. 
at 252-53). In Bennun v. Rutgers State University, 941 F.2d 
154 (3d Cir. 1991), which also involved a rejected bid for 
tenure at Rutgers, we explained that the plaintiff must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she is 
within a protected class, that she applied for, was qualified 
for and was rejected for the position she sought and that 
nonmembers of the protected class were treated more 
favorably. Id. at 170. Here, the parties do not dispute that 
Stewart did just that. 
 
After an employee has established a prima facie case, this 
creates a presumption of discriminatory intent by the 
defendant-employer. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. The burden 
then shifts to the defendant to produce evidence that the 
adverse employment action was taken "for a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason." Id. "To accomplish this, the 
defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction 
of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff 's 
rejection," id. at 255, which would support a jury finding 
that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the 
adverse employment action. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507. If the 
defendant's evidence creates a genuine issue of fact, the 
presumption of discrimination drops from the case. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 260 (noting that "the defendant bears 
only the burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory 
reasons for its actions"); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and 
Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3d Cir. 1992). The burden 
then falls upon the plaintiff to prove that the "employer's 
proffered reason [for the employment action] was not the 
true reason for the . . . decision" but was instead 
pretextual. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508. 
 
In Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1990), we 
explained that in order to make the requisite showing of 
pretext, 
 
the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's 
decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual 
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dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus 
motivated the employer, not whether the employer is 
wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent. Rather, the . .. 
plaintiff must demonstrate such weakness, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or 
contradictions in the employers's proffered legitimate 
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could 
rationally find them `unworthy of credence,' and hence 
infer `that the employer did not act for [the asserted] 
nondiscriminatory reasons.' 
 
Id. at 765. 
 
In order for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment at 
this stage, she must present sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendant's 
proffered reasons were not its true reasons for the 
challenged employment action. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 
("[T]o defeat summary judgment when the defendant 
answers the plaintiff's prima facie case with legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reasons for its action, the plaintiff must 
point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from 
which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the 
employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that 
an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than 
not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's 
action."); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 
F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). The crux of the 
district court's decision was that Stewart failed to make 
such a showing. 
 
C. 
 
Stewart may avoid summary judgment by establishing 
that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that invidious 
discrimination more likely than not motivated the adverse 
action. Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 
326, 331 (3d Cir. 1995). In reaching the conclusion that 
Stewart could not make such a showing, the district court 
declined to consider a significant piece of circumstantial 
evidence offered by Stewart: the grievance committee's 
conclusion that the denial of tenure to Stewart in 1992-93 
was "arbitrary and capricious." In doing so, the district 
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court failed to give Stewart the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences. 
 
Stewart points to the grievance committee's findings 
regarding her 1992-1993 tenure rejection. The grievance 
procedure is provided by the American Association of 
University Professors, with whom Rutgers has an 
agreement, with the purpose of "ensur[ing] the integrity of 
the reappointment, promotion, and tenure procedures; to 
provide a process for determining whether evaluations 
resulting in negative personnel actions were flawed . . . and 
to provide remedies in cases where defects are found." 
While the district court was correct in finding that any 
discrimination claim based on Stewart's 1992-93 tenure 
denial is time-barred, we reject the notion that the events 
surrounding that denial are not relevant evidence which 
Stewart could use at trial. See United Air Lines v. Evans, 
431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977) ("A discriminatory act which is 
not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal 
equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the 
statute was passed. It may constitute relevant background 
evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current 
practice is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely 
an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal 
consequences."). 
 
The grievance committee found that the PRC's decision to 
deny Stewart's promotion to associate professor was 
"arbitrary and capricious" and "could not have been 
reached by reasonable evaluators." JA at 109. It noted 
various inconsistencies and procedural errors. For example, 
in reviewing the PRC's conclusion that Stewart's 
substantive contribution to scholarship was inadequate the 
committee noted that the PRC's characterization of her 
work as merely "promising" failed to "reflect the fact that six 
of the nine outside letters, including letters written by 
nationally recognized leaders in the field, spoke of Professor 
Stewart's work as considerably more than simply 
`promising.' " Id. at 114. The grievance committee also 
criticized the PRC's finding that "some" evaluators 
questioned the independence and quality of Stewart's work. 
Id. The committee stated that "[w]hile it is true that some 
evaluators from Rutgers did make this judgment, we found 
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no evidence of this opinion regarding the independence or 
quality of Stewart's work in any of the nine letters written 
by outside reviewers." Id. Due to these factual and 
procedural inconsistencies and, according to the grievance 
committee, "arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of 
the PRC," the committee ordered that Stewart's tenure bid 
be reevaluated. 
 
In our view, this is sufficient evidence upon which a jury 
could conclude that Stewart's 1994-95 tenure denial may 
have stemmed from discrimination based on race. See 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977) 
("Departures from the normal procedural sequence also 
might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a 
role. Substantive departures, too, may be relevant, 
particularly if the factors usually considered important by 
the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the 
one reached."). 
 
We conclude that the grievance committee's finding that 
Stewart's 1992-93 rejected tenure bid "could not have been 
reached by reasonable evaluators" is sufficient to defeat 
Rutgers' motion for summary judgment since it presents a 
genuine material issue as to whether the tenure denial was 
a product of discrimination. Accordingly, we find that 
summary judgment was improper.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Stewart also alleged that Rutgers' proffered nondiscriminatory reason 
for nonpromotion was "unworthy of credence." The district court, in its 
opinion, styled Rutgers' non-discriminatory justification for denying 
Stewart tenure as: (1) Drs. Smith and Kelly published more material in 
journals considered as "top-tier," (2) Smith and Kelly had been awarded 
more funds than Stewart, and (3) the defendants' evaluation of Stewart 
was properly based on subjective qualitative evaluations of her work, 
which the defendants found inadequate to justify promotion. JA at 41. 
 
Stewart contends that the district court ignored significant evidence of 
pretext. Stewart relates that the PRC relied extensively on the outside 
evaluators to assess her scholarship. This is significant, Stewart 
contends, because no committee member had direct or relevant 
experience in Stewart's area of expertise. Stewart also argues that her 
negative references were highlighted while the negative reviews of Drs. 
Kelly and Smith were not. Finally Stewart contends that the difference in 
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III. 
 
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district 
court's order and remand for trial. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the amount of grant money she obtained in relation to Smith was too 
minute to be reasonably relied upon by Rutgers as a reason for 
nonpromotion. 
 
Because we conclude that the district court's grant of summary 
judgment was improper, in light of its failure to consider the grievance 
committee's finding of arbitrariness as probative evidence of racial 
animus, we need not reach Stewart's contention that Rutgers' proffered 
reasons for her tenure denial are "unworthy of credence."                      
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